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For many years researchers have studied why children reproduce actions that are not essential 
to achieving an external goal, a behaviour dubbed “over-imitation” (Gardiner, 2014; Lyons, 
Young & Keil, 2007; McGuigan, Makinson & Whiten, 2011). For example, if children watch 
someone tap a box before opening the box to retrieve a toy, children often copy the irrelevant 
tapping before opening the box (Horner & Whiten, 2005). The crucial question is why 
children copy said irrelevant actions.  
Key hypotheses put forward to explain over-imitation are (a) children mistakenly 
think the irrelevant action is causally necessary to achieve the goal (e.g., Lyons, Damrosch, 
Lin, Macris & Keil, 2011; Lyons et al., 2007); (b) they regard the action as normatively 
prescribed (i.e., what they ought to do; e.g., Kenward, 2012; Keupp, Bancken, Schillmöller, 
Rakoczy & Behne, 2016; Keupp, Behne & Rakoczy, 2013); (c) they want to affiliate with the 
model by copying all their actions accurately, although they know the actions are not efficient 
(Nielsen, 2006; Nielsen & Blank, 2011; Nielsen & Tomaselli, 2010; Over & Carpenter, 
2012).  
Whilst there is evidence supporting each theory (for a comprehensive review see 
Hoehl, Keupp, Schleihauf, McGuigan, Buttelmann & Whiten, 2019) we argue for a fourth 
explanation, which we refer to as the movement-based goal inference account. Over-imitation 
occurs because children, like adults, can interpret inefficient, irrelevant movements as goals 
in themselves. When adults cannot see a clear external goal to a model’s intentional action, 
they tend to infer movement-based goals, where they believe that the model’s goal is simply 
to move in a certain way (Baker, Saxe & Tenenbaum, 2009; Schachner & Carey, 2013). 
Interpreting a model’s movements as an independent, valid goal (e.g., dancing; ritualistic 
actions) could explain why adults – and children – imitate faithfully.  
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Previous literature suggests that both adults and children attribute goals to other 
agents’ actions. Adults naturally assume that movements are means to an end (e.g., Baker, 
Goodman & Tenenbaum, 2008; Lombrozo, 2010; Schneider, Slaughter & Dux, 2017) and 
that consequently the actions of others have goals (Froese & Leavens, 2014). When adults see 
agents perform arbitrary actions without any relevant context (e.g., jumping up and down and 
from side-to-side), they are more likely to infer that the movements themselves were the goal 
(e.g., the agent wanted to dance) than when the same actions are performed in a relevant 
context (when the same agent manipulates objects by performing the exact same movements; 
Schachner & Carey, 2013, Experiment 1; Novack, Wakefield & Goldin-Meadow, 2016). 
Schachner and Carey (2013) describe two factors encouraging movement-based goal 
inference in adults: when no external goals can explain the movement, or when actions are 
deliberate yet clearly inefficient towards achieving a known external goal. As over-imitation 
tasks often use “meaningless” actions (Horner & Whiten, 2005; Hoehl et al., 2019), 
participants may attribute movement-based goals to these actions, leading to faithful 
imitation. The idea that the perceived ‘inefficiency’ of an action influences imitation is 
closely related to work on ‘rational imitation’ (Gergely, Bekkering & Király, 2002; Gergely 
& Csibra, 2003). Already 12-months-olds interpret actions as goal-directed and expect agents 
to realise goal-states in the most efficient way. They will imitate inefficient actions only 
when these actions cannot not be rationalised by any given constraints (Gergely et al., 2002, 
but see Paulus, 2012).  
Movement-based goal inference can explain several findings from imitation research. 
Firstly, children copy actions more faithfully when these actions are presented as normative 
or conventional (Rakoczy, Warneken & Tomasello, 2008; Keupp et al., 2013, 2016; Nielsen, 
Kapitány & Elkins, 2015). Actions in over-imitation paradigms often involve some degree of 
repetition and inefficiency, which is indicative of movement-based goals. Secondly, identical 
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actions are imitated differently depending on the goal that is attributed to them. Elsner and 
Pfeifer (2012) show that pre-schoolers’ imitation of identical movements is determined by the 
presence of salient external goals. Actions performed without goals are more likely to be seen 
as performed for their own sake. Finally, young children imitate actions more faithfully if 
they believe those actions are causally irrelevant (Marsh, Ropar & Hamilton, 2014). Although 
these findings provide only indirect evidence, they are predicted by the movement-based goal 
inference account of over-imitation.  
Wakefield, Novack and Goldin-Meadow (2018) recently investigated whether young 
children infer movement-based goals as adults do. Models demonstrated actions either with 
objects (i.e., moving a ball into a box) or with no objects present (i.e., moving hands up and 
down). When 4- to 9-year-olds were asked what the models were doing, they were more 
likely to infer movement-based goals for the actions performed without external goals (when 
no objects were present). However, Wakefield et al. (2018) did not look at imitation. 
Investigating the link between movement-based goal inference and faithful imitation is 
therefore warranted. 
Our paper aims to provide the first evidence that the factors leading to movement-
based goal inference encourage faithful imitation in children. In three experiments, children 
were asked to imitate either body actions or actions on objects demonstrated by a model 
(similar to tasks by Carpenter, Call & Tomasello, 2005, and Gleissner, Meltzoff & 
Bekkering, 2000). The actions were performed either with or without external goals.  
In our experiments the model always performed their actions in a specific manner: for 
example, when moving a coin into a box, the model hopped the coin across the table. It is this 
movement-style, this unusual manner of performing the action, which we use as the index of 
movement-based goal inference. If children copy the movement-style when replicating the 
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action, then this indicates that they believed the movement-style was one of the model’s 
goals. We predict that children are more likely to copy this movement-style if they believe 
the model was performing it for its own sake. In contrast, if children do not infer movement-
based goals, then they should be less likely to imitate the movement-style. 
Experiment 1 shows that children imitated movement-styles of actions lacking clear 
external goals (performed with ‘no context’) more faithfully than of actions with clear 
external goals (performed with ‘context’), replicating previous findings. Experiment 2 shows 
that the difference between these conditions was not due to the absence/presence of external 
goals, but also occurred when actions brought about external goals in a clearly inefficient 
way. Thus, the two conditions argued to increase movement-based goal inference also 
increased imitation fidelity. Experiment 3 controlled for the possibility that imitation fidelity 
was affected by the number of actions and objects present during the demonstration, as visual 
information has been argued to affect imitation (Leighton, Bird & Heyes, 2010).  
EXPERIMENT 1 
Two- to five-year-olds saw object- and body-related actions performed in tasks modelled 
after Carpenter et al. (2005) and Gleissner et al. (2000). The actions were demonstrated either 
in the context of an external goal or without context. For instance, in one object-related task 
coloured coins were hopped either towards a box and slotted in (Context, C) or towards a pre-
defined location on the table (No Context, NC). In each condition the action demonstrated by 
the model was performed with a distinctive movement-style (e.g., hopping the coins across 
the table). Similarly, in the body-related tasks the experimenter performed a movement in a 
distinctive manner (e.g., crossing her arms and lifting them to shoulder height) that either had 
a visible goal (e.g., rubbing her shoulders) or did not (e.g., performed the arm action without 
touching her shoulders whilst holding her arms crossed). The movement-styles of each action 
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were the crucial dependent variable. They were all unusual, inefficient ways of performing 
the actions. Movement-based goals should be inferred more in NC because the hopping 
movement does not lead to an external goal. We therefore predict that children will replicate 
movement-styles (e.g., the hopping movement) more often in NC than in C if they interpreted 
movement-styles to be a goal in themselves.  
As well as recording movement-style imitation, we also recorded whether children 
imitated the end-state produced by the model. This would reveal whether focussing on the 
precise movements affected children’s reproduction of the end-state. We predict that due to 
the nature of movement-based goal inference, imitation of end-states should be unaffected. 
Three more details need to be added. Firstly, previous imitation research often used 
novel labels to help children focus on the tasks (Rakoczy et al., 2008; Keupp et al., 2013). To 
encourage greater attention, our tasks were introduced with novel labels (e.g., “wubsing”). 
Secondly, children between the ages of 2 to 5 years become increasingly likely to imitate 
faithfully (McGuigan et al., 2011; Moraru, Gomez & McGuigan, 2016; Yu & Kushnir, 2014). 
We therefore chose this age range and predict that, across both the NC and C conditions, 
older children would imitate movement-styles and end-states more faithfully than younger 
children. Finally, Kim, Óturai, Király and Knopf (2015) found that 18-month-olds imitate 
object-related actions more frequently than gestures, and are more likely to imitate object-
related actions (but not gestures) leading to salient effects. We therefore predict that children 
should imitate the end-states more on object-related tasks than on body-related tasks. We also 
predict an interaction between context (C vs. NC) and task-type (body- vs. object-related). 
Children should show greater end-state imitation in C of the object-related tasks but in no 
other conditions, because it is only in this condition that visible objects could serve as 




Participants. Participants were 30 children (Mage= 47 months, SD = 12 months) in two age 
groups: 2- to 3-year-olds (N = 15, 7 male, Mage = 38 months, SD = 5 months, range: 26 – 47 
months), and 4- to 5-year-olds (N = 15, 6 male, Mage = 56 months, SD = 8 months, range: 48 
– 70 months). All parents gave written consent prior to their children participating in the 
study and debrief forms were provided. Ethical approval was granted by the Psychology 
Ethics Committee of the University of _. 
Materials. Children were given four object-related tasks (Table 1A), each consisted of toys 
custom-made for the study. They were also shown four body-related tasks (Table 1B), 
consisting of everyday actions chosen based on previous studies (Gleissner et al., 2000; 
Stone, Ousley & Littleford, 1997; Zmyj, Aschersleben, Prinz, & Daum, 2012). Table 1 details 
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(same in all conditions of 








Zigzagging the cut-outs 
across the table towards the 
location/target space 
Moving the cut-outs 
into the cup 
Moving the cut-outs to 
an unmarked location 
on the table 
 
Moving the cut-outs 
from their pile to their 
corresponding shape, 
then placing the cut-
outs in the cup 
Moving the cut-outs 
to unmarked places to 
the side, then placing 












Dragging the stick pencil 
across the table Moving the pencil 
across the table 
towards the bell and 
ringing the bell with 
the pencil 
Moving the pencil 
across the table to an 
unmarked location on 
the table 
 
Drawing a circle on 
the paper with the 
pencil, then ringing 
the bell with the pencil 
Moving the pencil 
around in a circle on 
the table, then ringing 






 “Yemsing” / “Threading the beads on  







Moving the wooden beads 
across the table on their side Moving the wooden 
beads across the table 
towards the wire 
necklace, then placing 
the wooden beads 
onto the wire necklace 
Moving the wooden 
beads across the table 
to an unmarked 
location 
 Placing the wooden 
beads onto each of the 
prongs in a circle, then 
threading the beads 
onto the wire necklace 
Hopping the bead 
around in a circle, 
then threading the 




 “Wubsing”/ “Slotting the coins  







Jumping the coins across the 
table in a hopping motion 
Moving the coins 
towards the box and 
then slotting the coins 
into the box 
Moving the coins to 
an unmarked location 
 Sorting the coins by 
colour onto the 
corresponding shape, 
then slotting the coins 
into the box 
Moving the coins onto 
the unmarked 
locations, then 
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(same in all conditions of 








Holding one’s hand in a claw-
like position when moving 
one’s arm up and down 
Scratching one’s face 
Moving one’s hand up and 
down next to one’s face 
 
Scratching one’s 
face, then rubbing 
one’s hands 
Moving one’s hand up 
and down next to 
one’s face, then 
rubbing one’s hands 
 





Raising the arm from the front 
to the back of the head 
Patting one’s head 
Moving one’s hand up and 
down above one’s head 
 
Patting one’s head, 
then squeezing 
one’s nose 
Moving one’s hand up 
and down above one’s 














Holding one’s arms 
contralaterally when 
rubbing/moving the arms 
around one’s shoulders 
Rubbing one’s 
shoulders 
Crossing one’s arms up 
and down above one’s 
shoulders 




Crossing one’s arms 
up and down above 
one’s shoulders, then 
clapping one’s hands 
 






Using both arms when rubbing 
one’s earlobes/fingers 
Rubbing one’s earlobes 
Rubbing one’s fingers 
together above one’s ears 




Rubbing one’s fingers 
together above one’s 




Table 1B. Descriptions of the actions for the body-related tasks in Experiment 1 and 2
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Design. Each child participated in eight tasks: four object-related tasks and four body-related 
tasks labelled by novel words (e.g., “wubsing”). The most important factor, varied within-
subjects, was the context in which the action was presented: In the context-present condition 
(C) actions (e.g., hopping coins) had a clear external goal (slotting into the box), while in the 
context-absent condition (NC) actions were performed without clear goals (e.g., the coins 
were hopped towards a pre-defined, unmarked location on the table). Critically, actions were 
identical in both conditions. Each child saw two NC object-related tasks, two NC body-
related tasks, two C object-related tasks and two C body-related tasks. The order of the body- 
and object-related tasks was counterbalanced between children. The order of C and NC was 
counterbalanced using a Latin Square Design.  
Procedure. Children were tested individually in a separate room at their nursery.  
Object-related tasks. The experimenter said “Now I am going to show you something 
- this is how I wubs”. The experimenter demonstrated the action with a specific movement-
style (e.g., hopping). In C the action had a clear context (e.g., slotting coins into a box), 
whereas in NC the same movement had no context. After the first demonstration the 
experimenter reset the apparatus and repeated the demonstration two more times, saying 
“Now I will show you again” and “One more time”. The three demonstrations took under 30 
seconds to perform. 
Body-related tasks. Body-related tasks followed the same procedure as object-related 
tasks, but with no objects involved. For example, in C the experimenter rubbed her shoulders, 
whilst in NC, the experimenter just moved her arms up to shoulder height and moved her 
hands in a rubbing motion without contact. In both conditions, actions were performed with a 
specific movement-style: for example, the experimenter crossed her arms.  
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Coding. Coding was performed in situ by the experimenter. In the object-related tasks, 
children received a score of 1, if they pushed the shape left and right without breaking contact 
with the table (Gilbing), dragged a stick on its side without breaking contact with the table 
(Teebing), pushed the wooden bead across the table without breaking contact (Yemsing), and 
made the coins break contact with the mat more than once (Wubsing; see Carpenter et al., 
2005). In the body-related tasks, they received a score of 1 if they curled the fingers to 
perform a scratching hand movement (Quilling), rubbed their head from front to back 
(Lupping), moved their arms ipsilaterally (Zerping), and rubbed their earlobes bimanually 
(Daxing). 
If the child did not start by demonstrating the movement-style, but then corrected 
themselves, they received a score of 1. However, mixtures of movements, for example 
jumping and zig-zagging the object, were coded 0.  
As well as movement-styles, we recorded whether children imitated the end-state 
demonstrated by the model. For example, on the Wubsing task, if children placed the coin in 
the box/at the pre-defined location on the table, they were counted as imitating that end-state 
and received a score of 1 (regardless of whether they had imitated the movement-style). If 
they attempted but did not complete the end-state, they received a score of 0.5. If they did not 
imitate or if they performed an unrelated action, they received a score of 0. 
RESULTS 
Preliminary Analyses. There was no effect of task-order (object-related tasks first vs. body-
related tasks first) on movement-style or end-state imitation, all ps > .33, or of context-order 
(C first vs. NC first), all ps > .08. Girls and boys imitated at similar rates on all tasks for 




Movement Style Imitation. Figure 1A shows imitation accuracy for movement-styles, 
split for context, task-type and age-group. 
 
 
Figure 1. Imitation scores split for context (white bars: context-present; dark bars: context-
absent), task-type and age-group. 1A: Movement-style. 1B: End-state. Bars indicate standard 
errors.  
A 2 (context: context C vs. no context NC; within-subjects)  2 (task-type: object-
related vs. body-related, within-subjects)  2 (age-group: 2- to 3-year-olds vs. 4- to 5-year-
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imitation scores of movement-styles. We found a significant main effect of context, F(1, 28) 
= 24.03, p < .001, η2=.46, with more faithful imitation of movement-styles in NC (M = 1.53, 
SE = .10) than in C (M = 0.87, SE = .13). We also found a significant main effect of task-
type, F(1, 28) = 11.21, p = .002, partial η2=.29, and a main effect of age-group, F(1, 28) = 
6.61, p = .016, partial η2=.19. Children imitated movement-styles more faithfully on object-
related tasks (M = 1.42, SE = .10) than on body-related tasks, (M = 0.98, SE = .13) and the 
older children (M = 1.43, SE = .13) were more accurate than the younger children (M = 0.97, 
SE = .13).  
There was a significant interaction between context and task-type, F(1, 28) = 4.80, p = 
.037, partial η2=.15. Bonferroni corrected t-tests (p = .025) showed that on object-related 
tasks children imitated movement-styles more faithfully in NC (M = 1.83, SE = .08) than in C 
(M = 1, SE = .15), t(29) = 5.77, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 1.05. On the body-related tasks, 
children too imitated movement-styles more faithfully in NC (M = 1.23, SE = .159) than in C 
(M = .73, SE = .141), t(29) = 3.04, p = .005, Cohen’s d = .55. But the mean difference was 
greater on the object-related tasks (Mdiff = .83) than on the body-related tasks (Mdiff = .5), p = 
.039. No other interactions were significant, p > .19.  
End-state imitation. The same mixed factorial repeated-measures ANOVA was 
conducted on end-state imitation scores. We found no main effect of context, F(1, 28) = .578, 
p = .453, partial η2= .02, but a main effect of task-type, F(1, 28) = 21.02, p < .001, partial η2= 
.429, and of age-group, F(1, 28) = 5.32, p = .029, partial η2= .16. Children copied the end-
states more in object-related tasks (M = 1.71, SE = .089) than in body-related tasks (M = 1.04, 
SE = .115) and the older children (M = 1.54, SE = .102) imitated end-states more faithfully 
than the younger children (M = 1.21, SE = .102).  
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Context interacted significantly with task-type, F(1, 28) = 7.82, p = .009, partial η2= 
.218. However, Bonferroni corrected t-tests (p = .025) showed that the difference in end-state 
imitation scores was neither significant for object-related tasks (NC: M = 1.57, SE = .131; C: 
M = 1.85, SE = .08 , p = .035), nor for body-related tasks (NC: M = 1.12, SE = .145; C: M = 
.97, SE = .129, p = .174). No other interactions were significant, all ps > .06.  
Children occasionally failed to reproduce the end-state. To account for any influence 
of end-state imitation on movement-style imitation, we calculated a percentage score by 
dividing the number of trials on which children copied the movement-style by the number of 
trials on which they copied the end-state. The same ANOVA using this percentage score 
replicated the main effect of context on movement-style imitation, F(1, 28) = 17.31, p < .001, 
partial η2= .382. Children copied the movement-style more in NC (M = .733, SE = .058) than 
in C (M = .408, SE = .062). Using this conservative measure, no other main effects or 
interactions reached significance, all ps > .06.  
DISCUSSION 
Consistent with previous studies (Bekkering, Wohlschläger & Gattis, 2000; Carpenter et al., 
2005), children copied movement-styles (e.g., hopping), but not end-states, more accurately 
when external goals were absent. The goal-directed account of imitation (Bekkering et al., 
2000) suggests that when children perceive an external goal, they prioritise reproducing said 
goal rather than copying precise movements. Only when external goals are absent do children 
copy movements faithfully. Yet our data show that when end-state imitation was controlled 
for by using only valid trials, children still imitated movement-styles more precisely in NC, 
where there was no external goal. This suggests that imitating movement-styles less precisely 
was not just a matter of viewing external goals as more important than means.   
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The difference between movement-style imitation in NC and C was particularly 
pronounced on object-related tasks. Kim et al. (2015) report that object-related actions are 
imitated more precisely than gestures, and we replicated this for both end-goal and 
movement-style imitation. Salient objects may facilitate action encoding and retrieval 
(Elsner, 2007). Already 2-year-olds are less likely to copy actions lacking salient goals (Yu & 
Kushnir, 2014). Yet in our study movement-style accuracy was enhanced in context-absent 
conditions, when salient objects were removed. It is possible that children showed improved 
recall in the absence of distracting objects. The objects could have made children focus on 
reproducing the end-state instead of the movement-style. However, the difference between 
NC and C was not significant for end-state imitation on the object-related tasks. Furthermore 
there was a significant difference between NC and C on movement-style imitation for the 
body-related tasks, where children could not have been distracted by the presence of objects 
in C more than NC. This difference was also significant when using the percentage scores to 
control for end-state imitation. These findings speak against the possibility that memory 
resource limitations drove the context effects observed in Experiment 1, although we cannot 
rule this out for the object-related tasks (to control for this see our Experiment 2).  
 Finally, age affected both end-state and movement-style imitation. It is widely 
observed that imitation fidelity increases with age (McGuigan et al., 2011; Moraru et al., 
2016; Yu & Kushnir, 2014), which has been interpreted as older children imitating faithfully 
for social reasons. Given our results, where age did not interact with context or task-type, this 
interpretation seems plausible. The fact that end-state and movement-style imitation were 
equally affected by age additionally challenges the idea that memory limitations may prevent 
younger children from copying precisely.  
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Taken together, Experiment 1 fully replicates several previous findings, providing a 
good foundation to investigate our next question: whether children would imitate an action’s 
movement-style more faithfully if it achieved an external goal, but in an inefficient manner. 
EXPERIMENT 2 
Schachner and Carey (2013) proposed that movement-based goals are not only inferred for 
actions without external goals, but also when an external goal is achieved in a deliberately 
inefficient way. In their third experiment, adult participants were shown a video of a 
character holding a star. This character either jumped towards a star-marked box or jumped 
towards and away from the box. Adults were more likely to infer movement-based goals for 
the character jumping back and forth, which appeared inefficient towards a visible external 
goal. 
Experiment 2 investigated whether children would imitate actions more faithfully 
when these actions achieved an external goal inefficiently, versus when they achieved an 
external goal efficiently but via an intermediate-state. This tests the second claim of the 
movement-based goal inference account: movement-based external goals can be inferred in 
the presence of visible external goals, but only when these are achieved inefficiently. The 
findings from Experiment 1 suggest that perceiving an action as lacking a visible external 
goal encouraged movement-style imitation. Here we investigate whether action inefficiency 
also encourages this effect. 
Experiment 2 modified the tasks from Experiment 1 by having the experimenter either 
demonstrate an additional intermediate goal (IC condition) or not (NIC condition) before 
achieving a clear external end-goal (see Figure 2). In IC of the Wubsing task, for instance, the 
coins were now hopped towards colour-matched plates (intermediate goal), while in NIC the 
coins were hopped towards a blank, predefined location (no intermediate goal), before being 
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slotted into a box in both conditions (end-goal). Importantly, the hopping action was now 
always directed diagonally away from the box such that the action appeared particularly 
inefficient in NIC, because it did not achieve an intermediate goal.  
NIC of Experiment 2 closely resembles classic over-imitation tasks, which typically 
include actions lacking a clear external effect (e.g., coins are hopped to a nondescript 
location), but which eventually lead to an observable end-goal (e.g., slotting those coins into 
a box), making the intermediate action appear arbitrary and potentially inefficient towards the 
end-goal. In contrast IC of Experiment 2 can be interpreted as an external end-goal achieved 
via an unrelated intermediate goal. The comparison of these two conditions tests two 
predictions: 
Firstly, as movement-based goals are inferred for actions that are inefficient in 
bringing about a goal, we predict that, if children inferred movement-based goals, they should 
imitate movement-styles (e.g., hopping) more faithfully in NIC than in IC.  
Secondly, if the findings in Experiment 1 were driven by memory capabilities, 
children should now show lower imitation fidelity for end-goals in IC than in NIC. As the 
actions in NC of Experiment 1 lacked an external goal, there was less to remember and 
children may have simply found it easier to remember the movement-styles (Bekkering et al., 
2000). Now that there were two external goals (intermediate and end) in IC, children may 
imitate the end-goal of the action sequence less in IC than in NIC where this was the only 
end-goal. We therefore recorded reproduction of the intermediate-state (sorting coins) and the 
end-goal (e.g., slotting into the box) alongside movement-style imitation.  
Experiment 2 additionally looked at the effect of labels by varying the way the model 
referred to their actions. The model either called the task by a novel label (e.g., “wubsing”) or 
by its end-goal (e.g., “slotting the coin into the box”). Previous research suggests that 
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describing an action by its end-goal encourages children to imitate that goal (e.g., Gardiner, 
2014; Elsner & Pfeifer, 2012). We therefore predicted that children hearing the end-state 
label would be more likely to copy the end-goals of the tasks. We did not anticipate an effect 




Experiment 1 Experiment 2 




   
    




             
Action: Moving the coins towards the 
box 
Movement-style: Hopping the coins 
Action: Moving the coins across the 
table towards a predefined location 
Movement-style: Hopping the coins 
Action: Moving the coins to the plates, 
and then from the plate slotting the 
coins in the box 
Movement-style: Hopping the coins 
Action: Moving the coins across the 
table towards a predefined location, 
then slotting the coins in the box 
Movement-style: Hopping the coins 
 




Participants. Participants were 29 children aged 2 to 3 years (15 males, Mage = 40 months; 
SD = 5 months, range: 31 - 48 months) and 29 children aged 4 to 5 years (14 males, Mage = 
58 months SD = 7 months, range: 48 – 71 months). Children were randomly assigned to 
either the novel frame (n = 30, 12 males, Mage = 48 months SD = 10 months, range: 31 - 67 
months) or the end-state frame (n = 28, 16 males, Mage = 50 months SD = 11 months, range: 
34 – 71 months). The age of children in the novel and end-state frames were not significantly 
different, p = .339. Ethical approval was granted by the Psychology Ethics Committee of the 
University of _. 
Materials. Experiment 2 used the same materials as Experiment 1. Additional custom-made 
materials were used for the new intermediate goal (e.g., coloured plates). Table 1 details the 
materials and actions involved in each of the tasks.  
Design. Each child participated in four object-related tasks and four body-related tasks. Half 
of the children received the tasks using novel names (novel frame condition), for example 
“wubsing”, and half received the tasks naming the effect of the last action in the sequence 
(end-state frame condition), for example “slotting coins into the box”. Context was varied 
within-participants, so each child saw two NIC object-related tasks, two NIC body-related 
tasks, two IC object-related tasks and two IC body-related tasks. The order of context (IC vs. 
NIC) was varied between-subjects using a Latin Square Design.  
Procedure. Each child was tested individually in a separate room of the nursery.  
Object-related tasks. The experimenter began by saying: “Now I am going to show you 
something - this is how I wubs/slot the coins into the box”. The experimenter performed an 
action with a specific movement-style (e.g., hopping), as in Experiment 1. In IC the first 
action had a clear context, such as sorting coloured coins onto corresponding coloured plates 
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(intermediate-state), whereas in NIC the same sequence of movements was used without such 
a context (e.g., the plates were absent). In both conditions the coins were finally slotted into 
the box (end-goal).   
Body-related tasks. The experimenter said: “Now I am going to show you something - this is 
how I lupp/clap my hands”. The experimenter demonstrated the same actions as in 
Experiment 1, but finished with an additional external goal, for example, by clapping her 
hands.  
Coding. Coding was performed in situ by the experimenter. Coding for movement style 
imitation was conducted in the same way as in Experiment 1. Children were additionally 
coded on whether they imitated the intermediate action (e.g., hopping the coin/rubbing one’s 
earlobes) and the final action (e.g., slotting the coin into the box/rubbing one’s tummy) in 
each task. For both the intermediate and final actions, if children completed the goal, they 
received a score of 1. If they attempted but did not complete the goal they received a score of 
0.5. Otherwise they received a score of 0. Scores were coded separately for body-related 
tasks and object-related tasks.  
RESULTS 
Preliminary analyses. There were no significant effects of gender, context-order or task-
order on any scores, all ps > .1 (for Bonferroni-corrected comparisons with p = .025, all ps > 
.03). These variables were not considered further.  
Movement-style imitation. Figure 3 displays imitation of movement-style (A), intermediate-
state (B) and end-goal (C), split for context (NIC vs. IC), task-type (object-related vs. body-
related), and age (2- to 3-year-olds vs. 4- to 5-year-olds). 
A 2 (context: intermediate context IC vs. no intermediate context NIC; within-
subjects)  2 (task-type: object-related vs. body-related, within-subjects)  2 (age -group: 2- 
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to 3-year-olds vs. 4- to 5-year-olds, between-subjects) x 2 (verbal frame: novel label vs. end-
state label, between-subjects) mixed factorial repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted on 
movement-style imitation. Replicating Experiment 1, there was a significant main effect of 
context, F(1, 54) = 43.73, p < .001, partial η2=.45. Movement-styles were imitated more 
faithfully in NIC (M = 1.42, SE = .07) than in IC (M = 0.93, SE = .07). There were significant 
main effects of task-type, F(1, 54) = 11.23, p = .001, partial η2=.17, and age-group, F(1, 54) = 
10.17, p = .002, partial η2=.16. Movement-style imitation was greater for object-related tasks 
(M = 1.35, SE = .06) than for body-related tasks (M = 1.00, SE = .09), and the older children 
(M = 1.35, SE = .08) imitated more accurately than the younger children (M = 0.99, SE = 
.08). There was no main effect of verbal frame, F(1, 54) = .19, p = .67 and no interactions 
with verbal frame were significant, all ps > .11.  
Context interacted significantly with task-type, F(1, 54) = 4.54, p = .038, partial η2= 
.078. Bonferroni corrected t-tests (p = .025) showed that children imitated movement-styles 
more faithfully in NIC than in IC on both the object-related tasks (NIC: M = 1.67, SE = .071; 
IC: M = 1.04, SE = .101);  t(57) = 5.57, p < .001, Cohen’s d = .73) and the body-related tasks 
(NIC: M = 1.17, SE = .099; IC: M = .828, SE = .102, t(57) = 3.81, p < .001, Cohen’s d = .5). 
The difference between NIC and IC was larger on object-related tasks (Mdiff = .64) than on 
body-related tasks (Mdiff = .34), p = .04. There was also a significant interaction between 
context and age-group, F(1, 54) = 5.05, p = .029, partial η2=.086. The difference between 
NIC and IC was significant in both the younger group (NIC: M = 1.33, SE = .1; IC: M = .67, 
SE = .062, t(28) = 6.21, p <.001, Cohen’s d = 1.15) and the older group (NIC: M = 1.52, SE = 
.094; IC: M = 1.19, SE = .112; t(28) = 3.18, p = .004, Cohen’s d = .589), but it was larger in 
younger children (Mdiff = .66) than in older children (Mdiff = .33), p = .031.  
As in Experiment 1 we computed percentage scores (i.e., the number of times children 
imitated the movement-style divided by the number of times they performed the 
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intermediate-state). The same ANOVA using these scores confirmed that the main effect of 
context was still significant, F(1, 53) = 33.92, p < .001, partial η2= .39. Children imitated 
movement-styles more often in NIC (M = .789, SE = .033) than in IC (M = .539, SE = .035).  













Object Body Object Body































Object Body Object Body

























Figure 3. Imitation scores split for intermediate context (white bars: intermediate context; 
dark bars: no intermediate context), task-type and age groups. 3A: Movement-style. 3B: 
Intermediate-state. 3C: End-goal. Bars indicate standard errors.  
 
Intermediate-state imitation. The same mixed factorial repeated-measures ANOVA was 
conducted on intermediate-state imitation scores (see Figure 3B). There was a significant 
main effect of task-type, F(1, 54) = 8.584, p = .005, partial η2=.137. Intermediate-states were 
imitated more faithfully on object-related tasks (M = 1.42, SE = .06) than on body-related 
tasks (M = 1.13, SE = .086). There was also a significant main effect of age-group, F(1, 54) = 
10.87, p = .002, partial η2=.168. Older children imitated the intermediate-states more 
faithfully (M = 1.45, SE = .078) than the younger children (M = 1.09, SE = .078). No other 
main effects or interactions were significant, (all ps > .07).  
End-goal imitation. For end-goal imitation scores there was a significant main effect of task-
type, F(1, 54) = 16.68, p < .001, partial η2=.24. As can be seen in Figure 3C, children 
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(M = 1.89, SE = .03) than on the body-related tasks (M = 1.51, SE = .09). No other main 
effects were significant (all ps > .2). 
Context interacted significantly with task-type, F(1, 54) = 4.46, p = .039, partial 
η2=.076, and with age, F(1, 54) = 4.12, p = .047, partial η2=.071. Children copied the end-
goal more faithfully in NIC (M = 1.97, SE = .021) than in IC (M = 1.81, SE = .052) of the 
object-related tasks, t(57) = 2.74, p = .008, Cohen’s d = .359, but not (p = .47) on the body-
related tasks (NIC: M = 1.48, SE = .096; IC: M = 1.54, SE = .1). Furthermore, younger 
children tended to copy end-goals more often in NIC (M = 1.71, SE = .07) than in IC (M = 
1.57, SE = .09), but the difference was not significant, p = .069. Older children also had 
similar end-goal imitation scores between NIC (M = 1.74, SE = .07) and IC (M = 1.78, SE = 
.07), p = .403. The difference between NIC and IC was larger for younger children (Mdiff = 
.138) than older children (Mdiff = .035), p = .045. No other interactions were significant, ps > 
.21.  
DISCUSSION 
Experiment 2 investigated whether children would copy movement-styles (e.g., hopping) less 
accurately when they appeared to lead to an intermediate goal (e.g., sorting coins onto plates) 
as opposed to when they appeared surprisingly inefficient (e.g., the coins were hopped 
towards an unmarked location). Replicating Experiment 1, children copied movement-styles 
more accurately when the action appeared inefficient (NIC) than when it achieved an 
intermediate external goal (IC). This difference was particularly pronounced in the object-
related tasks and suggests that movement-styles are more likely to be imitated when they 
appear inefficient towards an external goal, which is common in “over-imitation” paradigms. 
The crucial variable investigated in Experiment 2 was action inefficiency – the results 
indicate that movement-based goals can be inferred in the presence of external goals, when 
28 
 
these goals are achieved inefficiently. Unlike for movement-style imitation, context had no 
effect on intermediate-state imitation or end-state imitation on the body-related tasks. The 
only effect of context was to slightly increase end-state imitation on the object-related tasks. 
Copying an action’s goal and copying its precise movements are thus likely to be distinct 
processes (Vivanti & Hamilton, 2014).  
Children were expected to copy end-goals more in the end-state verbal frame, because 
this should emphasise end-goals (Gardiner, 2014). This prediction was not confirmed. 
However, in Experiments 1 and 2 children were encouraged to perform the action 
demonstrated by the model “Now it’s your turn to …”. The invitation to imitate may have 
encouraged faithful imitation (Hoehl et al., 2019), producing a ceiling effect on children’s 
imitation of the end-states which overshadowed the potential effect of verbal cues. This 
strong imitation of the end-states suggests that children’s imitation fidelity was not driven by 
memory limitations. This is further supported by there being no reduced imitation of the 
intermediate- or end-states in the IC condition. This suggests that memory limitations cannot 
fully explain the context effects from Experiments 1 and 2.  
Our findings support the hypothesis that children interpret inefficient actions as 
having movement-based goals. Movement-based goals are inferred more often when 
movements have no external effect (Experiment 1) or bring about goals in clearly inefficient 
ways (Experiment 2). In the NIC condition of Experiment 2 hopping the coins towards 
unmarked locations did not appear efficient towards slotting the coins into the box. In 
contrast, hopping the coins towards colour-matched plates could be interpreted as an 
unrelated intermediate goal (i.e., sorting the coins onto the plates). In this case children were 
less likely to infer movement-based goals of hopping the coins and instead focussed on the 
two distinct external goals.  
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There is however an alternative interpretation to our data. Leighton et al. (2010) argue 
that different visual cues could cause children to imitate differently between the context 
conditions. While in (I)C the coins were hopped towards a box (Experiment 1) or coloured 
plates (Experiment 2), in N(I)C the coins were hopped towards unmarked locations. 
Generalist accounts of imitation (e.g., the Associative Sequence Learning model; Catmur, 
Walsh & Heyes, 2009) would argue that imitation in N(I)C may be enhanced because fewer 
visual cues can distract children from the model’s actual movement. Fewer visual cues may 
ease imitation fidelity, instead of movement-based goal inference. Kim et al. (2015) also 
suggested that objects could act as external cues to goals (e.g., a box with a slit may trigger 
slotting), thus removing attention from movement-styles. In line with this, the difference in 
movement-style imitation between N(I)C and (I)C was greater in the object-related tasks than 
the body-related tasks in Experiments 1 and 2. Furthermore on the object-related tasks 
children imitated the end-state in tendency more in NIC than in IC. This could be due to 
visual cue differences – more objects in IC could have distracted children from the 
movement-style. Therefore, in Experiment 3 we explicitly controlled for whether children’s 
imitation on object-related tasks was driven by the number of visual cues present.  
EXPERIMENT 3 
To isolate the effect of visual cues on imitation we compared C of Experiment 1 with NIC of 
Experiment 2. A potentially critical difference between these conditions was that in C the 
movements were directed towards the end-goal (e.g., coins were hopped directly towards and 
slotted into the box) whereas in NIC of Experiment 2 the movements were directed towards 
an unmarked location, before the coins were slotted into the box (thus appearing inefficient). 
In these conditions, the number of objects present and the number of actions performed were 
matched. The only difference is that the hopping action appears more inefficient in NIC than 
in C. Schachner and Carey (2013, Experiment 3) found that adults’ movement-based goal 
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inference was driven by the movement’s perceived inefficiency. Thus, we predicted that 
children would be more likely to infer movement-based goals in NIC where the movement-
style appears inefficient towards the external goal. Such a finding would challenge the claim 
that the context effects in our previous experiments were caused by differences in visual cues, 
as both conditions used identical materials in Experiment 3. As the crucial factor in 
Experiment 3 was the amount of visual cues present, we did not include body-related tasks, 
although we note that the effect of context was observed for the body-related tasks in 
Experiments 1 and 2. As the visual information was identical across conditions in the body-
related tasks, this suggests already that visual cues were not driving imitation fidelity. 
Finding a similar effect on the object-related tasks would strengthen our interpretation of the 
context effect. Also, as Experiment 2 found no difference between the two verbal frame 
conditions, in Experiment 3 all actions were described using the novel labels like in 
Experiment 1.  
Participants. Participants were 36 children (14 female, Mage = 47.2 months, SD = 4.8 months, 
range: 36 – 60 months). We split the sample via median age producing a group of children 
under 4 years (n = 20, 8 female) and a group who were 4 years and older (n = 16, 6 female). 
Ethical approval was granted by the University of _’s Social Sciences Research Ethics 
Committee.  
Materials and Procedure. The materials and procedure were identical to those in C of 
Experiment 1 and NIC of Experiment 2 (see Figure 2). In a within-participants design, 
children saw two NIC tasks and two C tasks. Critically, the movements were identical in 




Coding. Coding was performed in situ by the experimenter. The experimenter recorded 
whether children reproduced the movement-styles of each action, using the criteria from 
Experiments 1 and 2. An observer coded 40% the data in situ alongside the experimenter. 
Agreement between the experimenters was perfect.  
Results. There were no significant effects of gender, context-order or task-order on the 
imitation scores, all ps > .1. These variables are not considered further. 
Movement style imitation. We conducted a 2 (context: external context C vs. no intermediate 
context NIC; within-subjects)  2 (age -group: younger vs. older, between-subjects) mixed 
factorial repeated-measures ANOVA on movement-style scores (see Figure 4A). We found a 
significant main effect of context, F(1, 34) = 4.35, p = .045, partial η2 = .113, but no main 
effect of age-group, F(1, 34) =  1.81, p = .188, partial η2= .05. Children were more likely to 
copy the movement-style in NIC (M = 1.52, SD = .59) than in C (M = 1.18, SD = .64). 
Context did not interact with age, F(1, 34) = .29, p = .59, partial η2 = .009.1  
End-goal imitation. We conducted the same ANOVA on end-goal imitation scores (see 
Figure 4B). There was no significant main effect of context, F(1, 34) = 3.421, p = .071, 
partial η2 = .091, or of age-group, p > .99. Context did not interact with age-group, F(1, 34) = 
1.52, p = .226, partial η2 =.043. 
                                                          
1 Whilst Experiment 3 presents new data, we also compared condition C in Experiment 1 and NIC of 
Experiment 2 in our existing data. The results showed that children copied movement-styles more faithfully in 
NIC (M = 1.83, SE = .084) than in C (M = 1.1, SE = .139), t(47.9) = 4.52, p<.001, Cohen’s d = 1.16. This 






Figure 4. Imitation scores split for context (white bars: context, C; dark bars: no intermediate 
context, NIC) for both age groups. 4A: Movement-style. 4B: End-goal. Bars indicate standard 
errors.   
DISCUSSION 
Experiment 3 investigated whether visual information accounted for the context 
effects in the object-related tasks of Experiments 1 and 2. Even when the number of actions 





























































they appeared more inefficient towards an external goal. However, the effect of context in 
Experiment 3 was smaller than in Experiments 1 and 2. Controlling for visual information 
may have reduced the effect of context, suggesting that visual cues can indeed affect 
imitation (Mizuguchi, Sugimura, Suzuki & Deguchi, 2011). This claim is compatible with the 
movement-based goal inference account – imitation is a multi-faceted phenomenon 
undoubtedly affected by general action processing mechanisms. Yet, our findings cannot be 
fully explained by the amount of visual information to be processed (Catmur et al., 2009).  
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
In three experiments we investigated whether pre-schoolers’ imitation is affected by varying 
the goal that can be attributed to agents’ actions. Experiment 1 replicated previous findings 
(Bekkering et al., 2000; Carpenter et al., 2005) that children imitate identical movement-
styles more precisely when they were performed without obvious external goals. This effect 
was pronounced on object-related tasks and was not observed for end-goal imitation. In 
Experiment 2, we compared conditions where identical movements were either seen as 
achieving an end-goal via an intermediate-goal or just achieving the end-goal inefficiently. 
Consistent with Experiment 1, movement-styles were copied more accurately when end-goals 
were achieved inefficiently. In contrast, context had no effect on whether children replicated 
the intermediate-states and end-goals. Experiment 3 confirmed that this context-specific 
effect on movement-styles was not fully explained by visual cue differences Taken together, 
children imitated the model more faithfully when their actions appeared inefficient.  
We suggest that this was due to children inferring that the model’s actions were being 
performed “for their own sake”. In Experiment 1, children imitated actions more faithfully 
when they were performed without external goals, suggesting that movement-based goals 
34 
 
were inferred in the absence of said external goals. Results from Experiments 2 and 3 suggest 
that the presence of external goals does not preclude movement-based goal inference – 
actions achieving external goals in inefficient ways can also be attributed movement-based 
goals. The context effect on movement-style imitation fidelity cannot be explained by 
memory limitations: in Experiments 1 and 2 the context effect occurred on the body-related 
tasks and there was no context effect on intermediate- or end-state imitation in Experiment 2. 
Likewise the context effect on movement-style imitation cannot be explained by differences 
in visual cues, as the effect occurred in Experiment 3 where visual cues were held constant. 
Taken together, our findings indicate that children were more likely to infer movement-based 
goals both for actions performed without external goals and actions achieving external goals 
inefficiently.  
To infer movement-styles as goals in themselves, pre-schoolers need the ability to 
infer likely goals for each action within the demonstrated action sequence. Loucks, Mutschler 
and Meltzoff (2017) showed that 3-year-olds can indeed infer separate goals for different 
actions, even when these actions are presented in an interleaved fashion. Children interpret 
movements as goals in themselves similarly to adults (Wakefield et al., 2018). Movements 
are seen as goals if they are inefficient towards an observed external goal, or seemingly 
voluntary in the absence of any external goal. In adults, this inference is suggested to be a 
form of inverse planning, following Bayesian inference (Baker et al., 2009). Goals are 
evaluated based on their prior probability, and then weighed against observed actions as 
likely explanations of behaviour. This process allows movements to be viewed as goals if no 
other explanation fits. Children may use the same process of Bayesian inverse planning to 
infer goals as pre-schoolers use Bayesian inference for causal inferences (Sobel, Tenenbaum 
& Gopnik, 2004) and word learning (Xu & Tenenbaum, 2007).  
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The movement-based goal inference account is compatible with the rational imitation 
literature. Gergely and colleagues (e.g., Gergely & Csibra, 2003; Gergely & Jacob, 2012) 
argue that children imitate irrelevant actions because they believe that intentional actions are 
done for good reasons. This ‘principle of rational action’ hypothesises that people’s actions 
help them achieve goals, and actions are attempted efficiently. When someone performs an 
action in an inefficient way, there must be some unknown reason for doing so (Gergely et al., 
2002). Movement-based goal inference could be a more specific formulation of this process. 
The goal ascribed to an agent (the “unknown reason”) is determined by action characteristics 
(Baker et al., 2008). In our study, children imitated identical actions more faithfully when 
they were performed inefficiently because these are more likely to be interpreted as being 
performed for their own sake. Movement-based goal inference is thus compatible with the 
principle of rational action.   
We do not claim that the movement-based goal inference account provides a unified 
theory of over-imitation. Even though there is evidence that when young children recognise 
that actions are performed for their own sake, they copy these actions more faithfully (Horner 
& Whiten, 2005; Kenward, 2012; Marsh et al., 2014), there is also evidence that children 
copy actions not performed in contact with a reward container less often than actions 
touching said container (Lyons et al., 2007; Taniguchi & Sanefuji, 2017). This is not 
predicted by the movement-based goal inference account which argues that actions 
performed with no external goal should be imitated more faithfully. Encouraging movement-
based goal inference may only foster faithful imitation in games or rituals, rather than when 
achieving a functional end (i.e., retrieving rewards from a box). Young children will imitate 
irrelevant actions less when with a model who displays no interest in those actions. Nielsen et 
al. (2015) conducted a study where, after watching a model demonstrate irrelevant actions 
(e.g., tapping a box before opening it), 4-year-olds interacted with models expressing 
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different requests. Children reproduced irrelevant actions more often when invited to play by 
the model than in the presence of a third party who wanted a different outcome (i.e., 
retrieving their toy from the box). Children were more likely to omit irrelevant actions to 
retrieve the third party’s toy. Whilst pre-schoolers may recognise that models have 
movement-based goals for performing unusual actions, Nielsen et al.’s findings show that one 
must also consider whether children wish to reproduce movement-based goals. Future work 
should investigate under which circumstances children feel compelled to imitate such goals. 
Our findings provide a preliminary hypothesis – in simple one-to-one games, children may 
imitate actions that indicate movement-based goals. This may not occur with a third party 
who expresses a different goal (Nielsen et al., 2015). 
Several future directions would benefit the arguments made here. Firstly, our results 
require replication across other tasks. We argue that movements will be inferred as goals if 
they appear inefficient towards a known external goal or if there is no external goal. As 
imitation is affected by different processes depending on the action being performed (Jones, 
2007), movement-based goals may be inferred more easily for some over-imitation tasks than 
others. The level of inefficiency of the ‘irrelevant’ actions on over-imitation tasks may 
determine the likelihood of children performing those actions faithfully. A review of how 
much movement-based goal inference can explain over-imitation in other imitation tasks 
would be beneficial to develop our account. 
Secondly, we predict abilities other than imitation to be affected by movement-based 
goal inference. One proposal is that children should also make predictions consistent with 
movement-based goals for an agent’s future actions. Schachner and Carey (2013) asked 
adults to watch a cartoon about a box that moved and jumped from side to side (Experiment 
1). They then paused the videos and asked participants to make predictions about where the 
agent would move next on the screen. Adults who inferred movement-based goals for the 
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agent’s actions expected them to continue their movement pattern. In contrast, adults who 
inferred external goals were far less likely to believe that the agent would continue the 
movement pattern. Investigating whether children’s action prediction varies with the apparent 
inefficiency of agents’ actions would strengthen our interpretation, by showing that action 
prediction and action inference are affected by the same variables.  
In conclusion, we show that children copy movements more accurately (a) when 
movements do not bring about an external goal and (b) when movements are clearly an 
inefficient means to bring about an external goal. In addition to other explanations suggesting 
that increased imitation of actions without obvious external goals is due to differences in the 
amount of visual information present, we propose that accuracy of imitation can be 
determined by movement-based goal inference for actions that are not causal or functional to 
an intended outcome. This finding expands current attempts to make sense of “over-
imitation” by providing evidence that high-fidelity imitation of arbitrary actions may be an 
instance of movement-based goal inference. Future work along the lines suggested above will 
strengthen our theoretical approach by showing the extent to which goal inference affects 
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